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Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress
Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of
Evidence
Michael M. Martin*
Not all the separation of powers issues raised in the early 1970's
centered on the extraordinary assertions of executive powers by the
Nixon White House.' Even as the Watergate drama was being played
out, relations between Congress and the federal courts reached a less
publicized turning point. In March 1973 Congress reversed over thirty-
five years of deference to the courts in procedural rulemaking2 and
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1964, J.D. 1966, University of Iowa;
B. Litt. 1968, Oxford University. Consultant, New York Law Revision Commission project to
codify the New York law of evidence. The author acknowledges with thanks the research and
editorial assistance of Robert Hershan, Fordham Law School Class of 1979, in the preparation of
this Article.
1. See, eg., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (impoundment of appropriated
funds); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege for White House tapes);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (surveillance of domestic subver-
sives); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (prior restraint of publication of
the Pentagon Papers); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)
(executive warmaking powers).
2. The enabling acts for rules of civil and appellate procedure, criminal procedure, and
procedure under the Bankruptcy Act each provide that rules prescribed thereunder by the
Supreme Court shall not take effect "until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice... and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688); 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-623, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001). Prior to
1973 Congress never used the ninety-day period to change, block, or delay rules prescribed by the
Court. See Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. Rv. 673, 675 n.18, 676 (1975); Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence andRulemaking, 84
YALE L.J. 9, 36-38 (1974). Following congressional action on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Congress postponed the effective dates of two groups of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and revised their substance. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (revising amendments promulgated
April 22, 1974,416 U.S. 1003 (1974)) (text of proposed amendments in H.R. Doc. No. 292, at 1-22
(1974), effective date of which postponed until Aug. 1, 1975, in Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No.
167
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postponed the effective date of evidence rules that had been prescribed
by the Supreme Court? Two years later the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, resembling in basic form but differing in significant details from
the rules prescribed by the Court, were approved by Congress and en-
acted into law.4 The separation of powers implications of this first
foray by Congress into comprehensive prescription of adjective law is
the subject of this Article.
An important characteristic of both the Supreme Court and the
statutory versions of the Federal Rules of Evidence is the flexibility
allowed the trial court in admitting and excluding evidence and in
otherwise conducting the trial. That the Federal Rules are not an ex-
haustive codification is one source of this flexibility. For example, the
rules contain no provisions dealing with impeachment by bias, interest,
or mental incapacity; with competency of infants; with impeachment
on collateral matters; or with the judge's power to comment on the evi-
dence.5 Thus, there are significant areas in which evidence rules will
continue to be made through the common-law process of case-by-case
adjudication.6 Flexibility is also provided by explicit grants of discre-
tion to trial courts in applying the Federal Rules. The most important
provision of this nature is rule 403, which authorizes exclusion of rele-
vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue delay. Equally im-
portant in the conception of the Federal Rules, if perhaps less likely to
have much practical effect,7 is the discretion given the court, under the
93-361, 88 Stat. 397); Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319, Act of Sept. 28, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (revising amendments promulgated April 26, 1976, 425 U.S.
1159 (1976)) (text of proposed amendments in H.R. Doc. No. 464, at 1-6 (1976), effective date of
which was postponed until Aug. 1, 1977, in Act of July 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-349, 90 Stat. 822).
3. Act of March 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The Court's orders prescribing the
rules were entered on November 20 and December 18, 1972, and the rules were transmitted to
Congress on January 4 and February 5, 1973. 409 U.S. 1132 (1973). The rules promulgated by
the Court were published at 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Fed. R. Evid.].
4. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (effective date, July
1, 1975).
5. The Supreme Court prescribed a rule dealing with summing up and comment by the
judge, Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 105, but it was deleted by the House Judiciary
Committee. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7078-79 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
6. Rule 501 explicitly provides for continuation of common-law processes in developing
privilege rules:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Actof Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interreted by the
courts f the United States in the light o/reason and experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
7. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
168
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"catch-all" hearsay exceptions, to admit hearsay not coming within the
listed exceptions if it has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness.' In addition, flexibility in application of the Federal Rules
arises from the traditional power of courts to interpret and construe
legislation. The court must decide, for example, whether the "customer
book" in a heroin distribution operation is a business record;9 whether
a statement by a suspended employee is an admission by the em-
ployer,l0 and whether the circumstances clearly corroborate the trust-
worthiness of an exculpatory declaration against interest."
In spite of the substantial flexibility retained in the structure of the
Federal Rules, it is clear that the purpose of many of the changes made
by Congress was to require the exclusion of evidence that would have
been admissible under the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Par-
ticularly with respect to hearsay, congressional modifications explicitly
limited admissibility. For example, memoranda of recorded recollec-
tion were made admissible only if "made or adopted by the witness";
the Court's version would not have excluded accurate memoranda even
if made by someone else and not adopted by the witness.'2 Likewise,
rule 803(8)(B) was amended to exclude reports of matters observed by
law enforcement personnel in criminal cases.' 3 Even the flexibility
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065-66 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. But see, e.g., United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United
States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303,
1305-06 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 865-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
8. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). For other instances in which the court is given discre-
tion in applying rules, see, e.g., FED. R. Evil. 611(b) (scope of cross-examination), 611 (c) (use of
leading questions), 612 (inspection of writing used to refresh recollection), 705 (prior disclosure of
facts underlying expert's opinion), 803(6), (8) (exclusion of business or public records for untrust-
worthiness).
9. See United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 163-65 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801
(1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
10. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 43 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976).
11. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1075 (1977). See also, ag., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72-73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (whether
pretrial notice requirements of rule 803(24) were intended to apply when existence of or need for
evidence being offered first comes to light during trial); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 289-
91 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (same); Gilmour v. Strescon Indus., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 146, 149-50 (E.D.
Pa.), affdmem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975) (whether statement by employee to his employer is
admission).
12. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(5) with Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 803(5).
See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 27, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 7073-74.
13. See 120 CONG. Rc. 2387-89 (1974); Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 803(8).
Other rules in which congressional changes had the effect of limiting admissibility included those
dealing with impeachment by prior convictions, prior inconsistent statements, and former testi-
mony. Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(b), 801(d)(1)(A), and 804(b)(1) with Proposed Fed. R. Evid.,
supra note 3, rules 609(b), 801(d)(1)(A), and 804(b)(1), respectively. See generaly H.R. REP. No.
169
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given by the "catch-all" exceptions was limited by the congressional
changes.14 First, a trial court is now required to determine that the
evidence offered under the exception is more probative than any other
reasonably procurable evidence. Second, the proponent must give no-
tice before trial of particulars of the statement and his intention to offer
it. Finally, it seems implicit that Congress, in deleting various hearsay
exceptions from the Court's version, determined that the deleted classes
of statements did not have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness."15 Thus, declarations against social interest or state-
ments of recent perception would apparently not come within the"catch-all" exceptions. 6
This Article focuses on the question whether, or to what extent, a
federal court is bound by the explicit and implicit restrictions placed by
Congress on a court's power to admit evidence. 17 This is a question
that did not arise prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
because previous prospective rulemaking in the procedural area was in
truth a judicial exercise. Although Congress had an implicit veto
power over rules of procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court, it
never exercised that power.' 8 Thus, a lower court's decision to disre-
gard a rule of procedure raised, as a practical matter, only problems of
the relations between superior and inferior courts. On the other hand,
disregard of, or substitution for, a Federal Rule of Evidence involves
1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7103,
7104 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 15, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7088.
14. The requirements of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) that "(A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact" and "(C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests ofjustice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence" really only restate the require-
ments of rules 401, 402, and 102. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 803-242 to -243
(1975).
15. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7079-80.
16. Cf. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 444 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D.
Cal. 1978) ("[lIt is unlikely that Congress meant this exception [rule 804(b)(5)] to be used to cir-
cumvent its own restriction of another exception [former testimony admissible only against parties
to action in which it was given or their successors in interest]."). But see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, rupra note 14, at 804-65, 804-111. Hearsay exceptions for declarations against social
interest and statements of recent perception were included in Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note
3, rules 804(b)(4) and 804(b)(2). Both provisions were subsequently deleted by the House Judici-
ary Committee. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6, 16, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 7079-80, 7089.
17. Rule 403 gives a court authority to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. Because of the broad discretion given the courts by this rule, it
will be difficult to construe a decision to exclude evidence as defiance of a congressional mandate
to admit it. See also note 74 infra & accompanying text.
18. See note 2 supra.
170
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relations between coordinate branches of government. The question
did not arise before comprehensive procedural rulemaking started in
the 1930's19 because the earlier evidence statutes were generally reme-
dial measures, adopted in a day when courts were more wed to strict
stare decisis even in procedural matters.2 0 In that context the courts
were willing to defer to the legislature in making reforms that they did
not consider appropriate subjects for judicial action. Now, however,
the courts do not take such a limited view of their own competence.21
Furthermore, in adopting evidence rules the legislature has generally
been more "conservative;" the courts adopted the "reform" positions.22
I. Evidence in the Federal Courts Before the Federal Rules23
The Federal Rules of Evidence are the first comprehensive set of
rules governing admissibility of evidence and the conduct of trials at
the federal level. Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules the federal
courts applied evidence rules from three major sources: common law,
statutes, and court rules. An overwhelming portion of the rules now
included in the Federal Rules had their origin as common-law princi-
ples and were never codified. The remaining rules, which had been
announced prospectively by the legislature as statutes and by the courts
as court rules, generally had one of two purposes: the regulation (and
usually "reform") of a rather narrow problem area or the incorporation
of a general body of evidence rules by reference.
Most evidence rules in the Anglo-American legal system have de-
veloped as a product of case-by-case adjudication. Major doctrines,
such as relevancy, the hearsay rule and most of its exceptions, judicial
notice, authentication and the "best evidence" rule, and rules gov-
erning opinions and expert witnesses, had their genesis and most of
their elaboration in judicial decisions.24 Thus, at the time of the Amer-
19. See note 2 supra. The history of procedural rulemaking for the federal courts is sketched
in C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 9 (2d ed. 1947) and 4 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1002-05 (1969).
20. See Weinstein, Reform ofFederal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905,
909 (1976); Williams, The Source ofAuthorityfor Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH.
U.L.Q. 459, 467 (1937).
21. Compare Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849) (Taney, CJ.) ("It is the prov-
ince of a court to expound the law, not to make it."), with Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., notes 12-13 supra & accompanying text. Whether either position can be charac-
terized as one of "reform" is convincingly questioned in 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5006, especially at 97, 108 (1977).
23. See generally 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, §§ 5001-04 for a
comprehensive discussion of this subject.
24. See G. NOKES, AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE 27 (4th ed. 1967); J. THAYER, A PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 2-4 (1898).
171
HeinOnline  -- 57 Tex. L. Rev. 171 1978-1979
Texas Law Review Vol. 57:167, 1979
ican Revolution there were very few English statutes dealing with what
would now be termed evidence, and most of those were either declara-
tive of judge-made law or intended to deal with problems going beyond
the conduct of trials.25 The legislature did not significantly enter the
field of comprehensive evidence rulemaking in England until 1854,
when the Common Law Procedure Act of that year included provisions
governing competency, impeachment, and proof of writings.26 In the
United States, statutory regulation of evidence was sporadic even dur-
ing the growth of legislative procedural rulemaking, which began in the
mid-nineteenth century.27
The federal evidence statutes existing prior to adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules can be classified into five major categories.28 First, Congress
had enacted legislation that restated or implemented constitutional
principles. In this category were laws granting a privilege against self-
incrimination in statements made before Congress29 and providing for
authentication of public acts and records pursuant to the full faith and
credit clause." A second category can best be described as including
rules that regulated relations between the government and its citizens.
For example, the Jencks Statute," by regulating disclosure of state-
25. See, e.g., Shop-books Evidence Act, 7 Jac. 1, c. 12 (1609); Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c.
3 (1677). Both statutes are discussed in 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-90
(1926) and 1 W. TIDD, PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH at lxxiv (4th Am. ed. 1856).
See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 127-222. See also G. NOKES, supra note 24, at 28; 21
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 61; Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and
Rts Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772, 773-74 (1936). One commentator notes that "the
English law of evidence may be described as modem; for many of its rules are not more than 300
years old." G. NoKES, supra note 24, at 18. Another includes the observation that "the subject of
evidence was not 'invented' until the 19th century." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
at xxi (2d ed. 1977).
26. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, §§ 18-27. See also Evidence
Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99.
27. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 68-75. The Field Code of 1848,
which served as the prototype for procedural reform, contained no provisions regulating the ad-
missibility of evidence. See Act of April 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. However, Field
had prepared evidence provisions that were subsequently adopted in Oregon and California. See
21 C. WRIGHT & K.- GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 68-69, 71-72.
28. The principal pre-1938 statutes and their implications in federal courts are discussed in 1
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 6-6b (3d ed. 1940) (apparently relying heavily on Sweeney, Federal or
State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 394 (1932)). See also 21 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 5001; Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-4 Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010, 1092-93 (1924).
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 833 (repealed 1970). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V
(privilege against self-incrimination).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1739 (1976). See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also Act of July 2,
1864, ch. 210, § 3, 13 Stat. 351 (barring racial discrimination in evaluating competency of wit-
nesses).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1976) (admissibility of confes-
sions). Both of the cited statutes were enacted in response to Supreme Court decisions: the former
172
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ments by government witnesses, balances national security interests
and the accused's interest in a "fair" trial.
Another category of evidence statutes includes those concerned es-
sentially with public policies extrinsic to the litigation process. Illustra-
tions include laws making reports to government agencies inadmissible
in order to encourage accurate and complete reporting3" and laws mak-
ing copies of official records admissible in order to keep originals avail-
able for the conduct of public business. 33 A fourth category, probably
encompassing most evidence statutes enacted before the Federal Rules,
consists of those adopted to relax the common-law rules of authentica-
tion, best evidence, and hearsay, all of which restricted the admissibil-
ity of business and public records. This category includes the Federal
Business Records Act 34 and numerous laws making government
records bearing specified signatures prima facie admissible as proof of
their contents.35
Finally, a number of statutes conformed the evidence rules in fed-
eral courts to the practice followed in the state in which a court sat.
The Rules of Decision Act, originally set forth in the Judiciary Act of
1789,36 provided that "the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at com-
mon law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. 37
The Conformity Act of 1872 explicitly required the federal courts to
use state rules of practice and procedure.38 Despite these acts, however,
to codify, but also to limit, Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); the latter to modify
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
32. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943); 45 U.S.C. §§ 33, 41 (1976).
33. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733, 1740, 1744 (1976).
34. Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 640, § 1, 49 Stat. 1561 (repealed 1975).
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3497 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1733-37, 1740, 1743-45 (1976).
36. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (as amended, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976)).
37. The Act was held applicable to evidence rules in McNeil v. Holbrook, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
84, 89-90 (1838). See generally 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 32-35. See also
Mode of Proof Act, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 90 (1789) (as amended, codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a))
("[Tihe mode of proof of oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall be the
same in all courts of the United States, as well as in the trial of causes in equity and of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, as of actions at common law."); 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 22, at 15-16.
38. [T]he practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in other than equity
and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform,
as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding ex-
isting at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such
circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding: Pro-
vided, however, That nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence under the
laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof.
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (repealed 1948) (emphasis in original). The proviso
was deleted in the 1875 codification. See Rev. Stat. § 914 (1875). See generally notes 139-55 infra
173
HeinOnline  -- 57 Tex. L. Rev. 173 1978-1979
Texas Law Review Vol. 57:167, 1979
there were many areas in which the federal courts followed their own
practice regarding admissibility of evidence and the conduct of trials.
In the first place, the references to "trials at common law" meant the
statutes did not apply to equity or admiralty proceedings.3 9 Further-
more, an early Supreme Court decision held that criminal prosecutions
were also not "trials at common law,"' 40 so the conformity statutes did
not apply to criminal cases either. Finally, judges were reluctant either
to adopt idiosyncratic state rules or to give up firmly held traditions in
federal practice, such as judicial comment on the evidence.4' In the
areas for which there was no requirement of conformity, as well as
those in which the federal courts declined to follow state judge-made
evidence rules, the federal courts continued the historic pattern of case-
by-case evidence law development.
The first time the Supreme Court exercised its power to make pro-
cedural rules for the lower courts was in the Equity Rules of 1822,42
although Congress had recognized that power in statutes since 1792.43
The Court revised those rules on several occasions,' and prescribed
and revised rules of admiralty45 and bankruptcy, 46 but prescribed no
rules dealing with evidence in common-law cases until the adoption of
& accompanying text. See also Competency of Witnesses Act, ch. 189, § 1, 12 Stat. 588 (1862)
(repealed 1948) ("That the laws of the State in which the court shall be held shall be the rules of
decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States, in trials at common
law, in equity, and admiralty.").
39. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 15-16.
40. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851). The Reid decision imposed
"static conformity" on evidence law in the federal court: "[Tihe rules of evidence in criminal
cases, are the rules which were in force in the respective states when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
passed." Id. at 366. The principle of Reid was disapproved, and common-law development "in
the light of general authority and sound reason" was restored, in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S.
467, 470-71 (1918). See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, at 194-95.
41. See, e.g., Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618, 625 (1898); Vicksburg & M.R.R. v. Putnam,
118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426,441-42 (1875). See generally H. HART &
H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 664-72 (2d ed. P. Bator et al.
1973); Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 397-404 (1935); notes
139-55 infra & accompanying text.
42. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at v
(1822). In its first term the Court prescribed "the Practice of the courts of King's Bench and
Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from
time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary." Sup. Ct. R.,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 413-14 (1927). See also Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
43. See Process Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276 (repealed 1948).
44. The principal revisions were the Equity Rules of 1842,42 U.S. (1 How.) at xli (1842), and
the Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627 (1912).
45. E.g., Rules of Practice of the Courts of the United States in Causes of Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at ix (1844); Rules of Practice for the Courts ofthe United
States in Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, 254 U.S. 671 (1920).
46. E.g., General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 172 U.S. 653 (1898); General Orders and
Forms in Bankruptcy, 305 U.S. 677 (1939).
174
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938."7 The civil procedure
rules specifically treated only a few questions about admissibility and
conduct of the trial: depositions and requests for admissions,48 objec-
tions and harmless error,49 effect of a refused offer of judgment, 50 proof
by stenographic transcripts,5 and authentication of official records.5 2
Similar provisions regulating evidence were included in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure beginning in 1946.11 In addition, both the
civil and criminal rules included provisions generally prescribing the
sources for evidence law to be applied. Civil rule 43(a) required appli-
cation of the relevant rule favoring admissibility, 4 while criminal rule
26 called for application of rules developed through common-law
processes.5 5 Both rules were adopted largely as stop-gap measures and
left development of federal evidence law to common-law processes un-
til a comprehensive code could be fashioned.56 By 1975 the Federal
Rules of Evidence were prepared under the aegis of the Supreme Court
and revised and adopted by Congress. The Federal Rules are largely a
restatement or revision of common law. The act adopting them re-
47. The Court's order adopting the rules was entered on December 20, 1937, and the rules
were submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in January 1938. Orders re Rules of Proce-
dure, 302 U.S. 783 (1938).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32, 36(b); Gf FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) (admissibility of answers to
interrogatories), 35(b)(2) (waiver of physician-patient privilege by requesting and receiving report
of physical or mental examination), 37(b)(2)(B) (inadmissibility of evidence as sanction for failure
to comply with discovery order).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 46, 61.
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 80(c).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 44(a). See also FED. R. EvID. 902(l)-(5).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e) (use of depositions), 26 (taking of testimony), 26.1 (de-
termination of foreign law), 27 (proof of official record), 51 (exceptions unnecessary).
54. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the
evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The
competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner.
FED. R Civ. P. 43(a), 28 U.S.C. app. (1970).
55. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evi-
dence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an
act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.
FED. R. C~aM. P. 26, 18 U.S.C. app. (1970).
56. See, e.g., Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Rules ofEvidence-4 Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibili y of Devel-
oping Unform Rules of Evidencefor the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 89-90 (1962).
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pealed only one statute,57 and only six provisions of the Rules of Civil
and Criminal Procedure were effectively superseded.5 8
II. Sources of Authority to Prescribe Evidence Rules
The historic existence of three sources of evidence law supports the
view that both Congress and the courts have authority to prescribe
rules of evidence. Arguments made half a century ago that procedural
rulemaking was, on the one hand, a nondelegable legislative function,59
or, on the other hand, an inherently and exclusively judicial function,60
are no longer credible. Rather, judicial interpretation and application
of the Constitution has confirmed that the power to govern the admissi-
57. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, sec. 2(b), 88 Stat. 1949, striking 28 U.S.C.
§ 1732(a) (1970) (Federal Business Records Act). A subsection (c) was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1733,
making the statute inapplicable to proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Evidence apply. Act
of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, sec. 2(c), 88 Stat. 1949 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1733(c) (1976)).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(8); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 18, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 7091-92.
58. The Court's orders prescribing the rules abrogated FED. R. Civ. P. 32(c), 43(b), (c) (1970)
and FED. R. CRiM. P. 28(a) (1970) and made substantial amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) and
FED. R. CI1M. P. 26. Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, 184, 186, 355-60. The orders were
expressly approved by Congress in the Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, sec. 3, 88 Stat. 1949
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976)). The Federal Rules incorporate by refer-
ence a substantial number of existing statutes. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802, 902(10).
59. E.g., Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 ORE. L. REV. 1
(1926), reprinted in 13 A.B.A.J. 87 (1927). In recent years the nondelegability argument has been
limited to substantive rules." For example, Mr. Justice Black stated his opposition to the Court's
promulgation of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
We believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping
details, many determine matters so substantially affecting the rights o/litigants in lawsuits
that in practical effect they are the equivalent of new legislation which, in our judgment,
the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and approved by
the President.
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 861, 865-66 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting) (emphasis added); accord, Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029,
1032-33 & n.1 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). Representative Holtzman made a similar separation
of powers argument, with explicit reliance on the "case or controversy" language of article III,
when she opposed adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The process [for amending the Federal Rules] is, I submit, unconstitutional as well.
The Supreme Court is not given the power under Article III of the Constitution to legis-
late rules on substantive matters. It can pass such judgments only in the context of a
particular case or controversy. Yet, H.R. 5453 [sic] allows the Court to promulgate a rule
in a substantivepolicy area without the benefit of an adversary proceeding. We cannot
(and should not) delegate such rule-making power to the Supreme Court.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 29, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7098
(separate views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman) (emphasis added).
60. E.g., Wigmore, 41l Legislative Rulesfor Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23
ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928). See Pound, The Rule-Making Power o/the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601
(1926). The most extreme application of the argument was made by the New Jersey courts in the
early 1950's. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 NJ. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 414, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
877 (1950); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 77-82 (1977); Kaplan
& Greene, The Legislature'r Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An 4ppraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1951); Pound, Procedure Under Rules o/Court in New Jersey, 66
HARv. L. REv. 28 (1952).
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bility of evidence and the conduct of trials is shared between the legis-
lative and judicial branches.
The constitutional source of Congress' power to regulate evidence
includes the grant of authority to enact legislation "necessary and
proper" to implement the powers granted the federal government.6'
Under any reasonable definition of "judicial power," rules of evidence
appear necessary and proper to the exercise of that power. In addition,
authority for statutory evidence rules might inhere in the power to es-
tablish inferior federal courts.62 The rules justified under this head,
however, usually go beyond matters of probative value and, instead,
constitute legislative judgments about subject matter jurisdiction or le-
gally-cognizable claims.63
The congressional power to make adjective law rules can be dele-
gated to the courts.' Delegations of rulemaking power have been in-
cluded in federal statutes beginning with the Judiciary Act of 178965
and have been exercised since the Equity Rules of 1822.66 In 1938 the
Court prescribed comprehensive rules of civil procedure, including
some evidence rules, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act adopted in
1934.67 That delegation and its exercise were upheld by the Court in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. :68 "Congress has undoubted power to regu-
late the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make
rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United
61. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; cf Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 51, 53-54 (1825) (comparing the judicial and legislative powers).
62. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: .4
Case Study on the Needfor Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IowA L. REV. 15, 69 (1977);
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 1018; Shanfeld, The Scope of Judicial Independence of the
Legislature in Matters of Procedure and Control of the Bar, 19 ST. Louis L. REV. 163, 165 (1934);
c. Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53 (1825); THE FEDERALIST NO.
83 (A. Hamilton), at 459 (rev. ed. G. Smith 1901) ("A power to constitute courts is a power to
prescribe the mode of trial .. "). The power to prescribe and regulate the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, para. 2, has also been suggested as a basis for
legislative control of court procedure. See Clinton, supra at 69-70; Note, Separation ofPowers and
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1059, 1065 (1975).
63. See, eg., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1871); cf. Taylor v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Mont. 1973) (Health Programs Extension Act of 1973,
§ 401(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7(a) (1976), "prohibits any court from finding that a hospital which
receives Hill-Burton funds is acting under color of state law").
64. E.g., Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61-62 (1825); Way-
man v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43, 47-48 (1825).
65. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83. See also Process Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36,
§ 2, 1 Stat. 276 (repealed 1946).
66. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at v
(1822). See notes 42-46 supra & accompanying text.
67. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (as amended, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976)).
68. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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States . ,,69 Congress passed an enabling act for comprehensive
criminal rules in 1940;70 and the Court prescribed the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which also included some evidence rules, in
1945.71
In addition to statutory delegation, the constitutional grant of the
judicial power to the federal courts arguably authorizes court-pre-
scribed evidence rules.72 Anglo-American evidence law has historically
been a product of case-by-case adjudication. Moreover, as courts de-
cide cases they inevitably create evidence law through the process of
interpreting statutes and fitting them to the specific facts of each case.
The question implicitly posed by congressional adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is thus not whether Congress exceeded its
authority in adopting them, but whether the Federal Rules as adopted
preempt contrary rules that a federal court might adopt or apply. In
most cases, there will be no preemption problem because of the flexibil-
ity of the Federal Rules: most situations in which a court might wish to
exclude evidence generally deemed admissible by Congress in the Fed-
eral Rules would be subject to the court's power under rule 403 to ex-
clude unduly prejudicial, confusing, or time-wasting evidence.73 In
addition, Congress has specifically given the court discretion in several
other rules to exclude untrustworthy evidence.74 Inter-branch conflicts
are more likely to arise when the Federal Rules exclude otherwise-rele-
vant evidence, or condition its admissibility on compliance with proce-
dural or other requirements. For example, because rule 803(8)(B)
prohibits the use of police officers' reports as substantive evidence in
criminal prosecutions, a judge admitting such a report on the ground
that it is as reliable as other business and official records would be
acting contrary to the express direction of Congress. Similarly, a judge
who admits hearsay under one of the catch-all exceptions if no notice
had been given before trial violates the requirements of the Federal
Rules. Some such difficulties can be resolved through the process of
69. Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
70. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (as amended, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3771
(1976)).
71. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 321 (prescribed Dec. 26, 1944, Feb. 8,
1946; effective March 21, 1946).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
73. But see FED. R. EvID. 609(a); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7103 ("The admission of prior convictions involving
dishonesty and false statement is not within the discretion of the Court"); United States v. Smith,
551 F.2d 348, 358-59 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'74. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 803(8), 804(b)(3); Gf FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), 609(b)
(court must determine whether probative value of conviction offered to impeach outweighs preju-
dicial effect).
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interpretation. For example, the court may determine that the exclud-
ing rule was not intended to apply to the given situation." Other ap-
parent conflicts can sometimes be resolved by reference to
constitutional limitations. For example, an excluding rule may be in-
applicable under the doctrine of Chambers v, Mississippi6 because it
would keep out reliable evidence helpful to an accused. Nevertheless,
there are situations in which the applicability of the rule is clear, the
congressional intent is unambiguous, and no constitutional rights are
involved. It is in these situations that the question arises whether, or to
what extent, the federal courts can substitute their judgment for that
expressed by Congress in the Federal Rules of Evidence.77
III. The Supremacy of Judicial Evidence Rules Indispensable to the
Exercise of the Judicial Power
The thesis of this Article is that the federal courts are supreme over
Congress regarding at least some rules of evidence, so that a court may
on some occasions disregard explicit directives in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. This argument is grounded on the constitutional grant of the
judicial power to the courts and a determination that some evidence
rules are "inherent"78 in that power.
A. Evidence Rules Within the Judicial Power
The Constitution does not define the nature and extent of the judi-
cial power vested in the courts by article III. The relevant language of
that article and elsewhere in the Constitution relates almost entirely to
subject matter jurisdiction and provides no assistance for inferring the
content of the power conferred. Knowing that the judicial power ex-
tends to specified "cases" and "controversies,"79 that Congress may es-
75. See United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977).
76. 410 U.S. 284, 300-03 (1973). See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 14, at 804-01 to
-03; ;f United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976) (rule 804(b)(3) construed as no
more restrictive than Constitution permits).
77. The questions thus posed are different from those usually considered heretofore: (1)
"whether the court may act at all" to promulgate procedural rules, and (2) "whether the legislature
has competence to review and rescind a promulgated rule." Levin & Amsterdam, Legisladve Con-
trol Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23
(1958).
78. In using the term "inherent" in this section, I have tried to resist the "constant invitation
to think words instead of things" by applying the tests of "analysis [Ze., whether "to deny these
powers and yet to conceive of courts is a self-contradiction"], history, and social utility." See
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 1023.
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. Representative Holtzman inferred from the "case or contro-
versy" requirement a prohibition on the Court making rules on substantive matters. See HousE
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tablish inferior courts, 0 and that Congress may regulate the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" tells us little about the power those
courts possess.
Records of the Constitutional Convention and discussions at the
time of ratification do not help define the judicial power of the federal
courts. The Framers were principally concerned with the allocation of
jurisdiction between the state and federal judicial systems, the method
of appointing judges, and whether judges should have the veto in the
law-making process. 82 Even when Edmund Randolph observed "the
difficulty in establishing the powers of the judiciary,"8 3 he was refer-
ring to the courts' jurisdiction, not to their proper functions.84
In all probability the judicial power was not defined because a
consensus existed concerning not only its general outlines but also its
specific content. Montesquieu, whose views on the separation of gov-
ernmental powers strongly influenced the Framers, 5 described the ju-
dicial function as the means by which government "punishes criminals,
or determines disputes that arise between individuals."8 6 The English
and colonial courts with which the Framers were familiar performed
this function. Since the Framers had a firmly established court system
in mind 7 over which no significant controversies about its method of
operation had arisen, perhaps they perceived no need to specify the
elements of the new government's judicial power.
In performing their essential function of deciding controversies,
REPORT, supra note 5, at 29, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7098; note 59
supra.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
82. See e.g., S. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 399-419 (1962); A. PRESCOTT,
DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 654-76 (1941); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION 325-35 (1928).
83. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 238 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
84. Id See also THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton); C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 331-
32:
[T]he framers made no provision whatever as to the powers of the Court-neither for
this power [to review the constitutionality of Acts of Congress] nor for any other function
or power exercised by the Court. It is always important to bear in mind that there is a
vital distinction between a Court's jurisdiction and a Court's power .... Having fixed
the Court's jurisdiction, the delegates assumed that the Court, having obtained jurisdic-
tion, would exercise all functions and powers which Courts were at that time in the
judicial habit of exercising.
85. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); S. PADOVER, supra note 82, at 25-26.
86. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (rev. ed. T. Nugent trans. 1900). See Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938) ("Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part
of our system of government").
87. See A. PRESCOTT, supra note 82, at 680; C. WARREN, supra note 82, at 332; Frankfurter
& Landis, supra note 28, at 1017 ("'Judicial power' sums up the whole history of the administra-
tion of justice in English and American courts through the centuries").
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both the English and the colonial courts applied "the law" as declared
by the legislature or discovered by the court. In addition, the courts
applied a body of principles developed largely on their own to govern
the process by which controversies were decided and relief given.88
The rules of evidence were included within this latter body of princi-
ples applied by the English and colonial courts. These rules regulated
the presentation of proof to the tribunal, the probative value given to
that proof, and the conduct of the trial. Thus, in giving the judicial
power to the courts, the Framers in all likelihood intended to include
the power to develop, as the English courts had developed, what we
would call rules of evidence.
B. Evidence Rules as an "Inherent" Judicial Power
Simply demonstrating that English courts developed rules of evi-
dence is insufficient to establish the thesis that some court-made evi-
dence rules preempt the Federal Rules of Evidence. Since the
Constitution was intended to create a government structured differ-
ently from England's, governmental functions were not necessarily to
be distributed in the same way. England's government was unitary,
with sovereignty in the King. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688,
that sovereignty was exercised by Parliament, but the allocation of
functions among the branches of government continued to be for the
convenience of the "sovereign," and all organs of government re-
mained subject to the supremacy of Parliament, the King's successor as
sovereign. In the United States, on the other hand, powers were dis-
tributed among branches of the government that were equal among
themselves and subject only to the sovereignty of "the people," who
had delegated their powers through the Constitution. Given this differ-
ence in principles of government organization, the historical exercise of
a power by an English governmental organ (for example, the House of
Lords acting as a court of appeal) does not necessarily indicate devolu-
tion of that function on the American counterpart.8 9
Nevertheless, reason suggests that developing and applying princi-
88. See also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 66:
Would it be sound to conclude that the judicial function is essentially the function
(in such cases as may be presented for decision) of authoritative application to particular
situations of general propositions drawn from preexisting sources-including as a neces-
sary incident the function of determining the facts of the particular situation and of
resolving uncertainties about the content of the applicable general propositions? Would
it be sound to conclude, in addition, that this function is an inescapable one in any
regime of law?
89. See generally Kaplan, The Validity of Legislative Regulation of Procedure, 16 TEMP. L.Q.
51, 51-52 (1941); Shanfeld, supra note 62, at 164-65; Tyler, supra note 25, at 772-74.
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ples of evidence is, analytically, part of the judicial power. In the An-
glo-American tradition, deciding cases involves applying not only rules
governing the merits of the controversies, but also a second body of
rules designed to apply the first set of rules to the merits of the particu-
lar controversy before the court. Among these rules of proceeding are
rules about the proof that may be presented and about the conduct of
the trial, i e., rules of evidence.
The power to apply rules of evidence is more than just an attribute
of the judicial power; it is indispensable to the exercise of the power. A
court admitting or excluding evidence on the judge's whim alone can-
not be said to be deciding cases according to law, as is its responsibility,
regardless of how faithful it is to the principles governing the merits. If
consistent "lawful" results are to be obtained, there must be consistency
in the process by which facts are judicially determined. This is not to
say that the rules of evidence need be complex, only that they must
establish a principled basis for the presentation of proof and the con-
duct of trials.
The indispensability of rules of evidence to the exercise of the ju-
dicial power, however, does not necessarily prove that the authority to
develop such rules is also indispensable. For example, a central princi-
ple of the separation of powers is a division between the development
of and the application of the principles governing the merits of a con-
troversy. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the judicial power referred to
in the Constitution includes as an indispensable .element the power to
make some kinds of evidence rules. As an historical matter, the Fram-
ers knew a system in which the courts made the rules of evidence. Al-
though the law applicable to the merits might have its source outside
the courts, the principles governing admissibility of evidence were
largely judicial creations.90 Placing all authority to make evidence
rules outside the courts would have been foreign to the judicial power
known to the Framers. This historical view is corroborated by the
length of time that passed before the legislatures finally reformed some
of the more egregious common-law evidence rules. They expected the
courts to do the job and stepped in only when judicial conservatism
allowed abuses to continue. 91 Implicitly, the notion up until the middle
90. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
91. See Grinnell, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules
of Evidence?, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 41, 45-47 (1940). In New York State a constitutional amend-
ment was thought to be necessary before the legislature could begin general procedure (including
evidence) law reform. See Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 512-13, 196 N.Y.S. 43, 51
(1922).
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of the nineteenth century was that such matters inhered in the judicial
power given the courts.
Analytically, the same conclusion follows. The power to make
rules of evidence is an indispensable component of the judicial power,
for if all evidence law were made outside the courts, evidence rules
could be fashioned that would prevent courts from fulfilling their con-
stitutional function of deciding controversies. That function is per-
formed by determining the "facts" involved in the controversies and
applying the "law" (from whatever source) to the facts so determined.92
If evidence rules are framed so that the facts that courts are allowed to
determine are not relevant to the resolution of the issues raised by the
substantive rules governing controversies between parties, then courts
cannot decide those controversies as they are required to do. To take
an extreme example, the application of a law declaring testimony by
males incompetent would significantly impair performance of the
courts' constitutional duty to decide controversies because the courts
would be foreclosed from discovering the true nature of those contro-
versies (assuming that men as a class are not unreliable witnesses). Al-
though some controversies, such as those involving only documentary
evidence or female witnesses, could be decided, the rule about male
witnesses would constitute a major obstacle to performance of the
courts' duty. Similarly, the authority to outlaw and punish contempts
has been held an indispensable part of the judicial power.93 If courts
could not punish contempts, their power to decide cases would not be
totally frustrated; however, it would be impaired if persons obstructing
the court could disobey judicial orders with impunity, 94 and the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch would be compromised if it had to
depend on another branch to remove obstructions to its proceedings. 95
Its independence is similarly impaired if it must depend on, or is lim-
ited by, another branch in determining and evaluating the facts of the
controversies it must adjudicate.96
92. Implicit in the transformation of the original conflict between the parties into a "persua-
sive conflict" in court, see Golding, Preliminaries to the Study ofProceduralJustice, in LAW, REA-
SON, AND JUSTICE 85-86 (G. Hughes ed. 1969), is the need to relate the two "conflicts" through
presentation of evidence.
93. Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-04 (1888). See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 227 (1821); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 28, at 1022.
94. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,
303 (1888); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
95. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 1020-22.
96. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) 128, 147 (1871):
In the case before us ... the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its
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C. Supremacy of "Inherent" Powers
Because the authority to make and apply evidence rules is indis-
pensable to the exercise of the judicial power granted the courts by the
Constitution, it cannot be among the powers that the legislature has a
residual power to allocate among the three principal branches. Super-
ficial notions of the separation of powers doctrine often fail to take into
account that there are many governmental powers that can be allocated
to any of the branches without violating the essential premises of the
doctrine.97 For example, the powers to regulate prices in commerce, 98
to set tariff rates,99 and to prescribe appropriate remedies in civil ac-
tions"° are rationally classifiable within the functions delegated to two
branches.10' When Congress acts pursuant to its authority to make
laws necessary and proper for execution of those powers,' 0 2 it decides
which branch shall exercise the power. 0 3 Powers explicitly granted in
the Constitution, or indispensable to the exercise of such powers (some-
times called "inherent" powers) are not, however, subject to this con-
gressional apportionment. 104
On the other hand, a power explicitly delegated to one depart-
own judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely
contrary.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power.
97. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240,251, 74 A.2d 406,411-12, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877
(1950); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REv. 28, 33-34 (1952);
Tyler, supra note 25, at 772.
98. See, e.g., FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Intermountain Rate
Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
99. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); 19 U.S.C. § 1202
(1976) (tariff rates adopted by Congress); 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1976) (authority of executive branch
to adjust tariff rates).
100. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). Congress' breadth of discretion in providing remedies and
remedial procedures is discussed in Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1366-67 (1953). The possibility that
certain equitable remedies may be constitutionally required (and thus beyond the power of Con-
gress to preclude) is suggested in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-18
(1971). See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 498, 530-32 (1974).
101. See Pound, supra note 97, at 34; Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining inci-
dental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
"The Sweeping Clause," 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 819-25 (1975), reprintedin 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROv.
102 (Spring 1976).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43, 46 (1825); Pound, supra note 97,
at 34; Reidl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of
Evidence, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 602 (1940); Tyler, supra note 25, at 772; cf State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio
St. 250, 258 (1877) (inherent powers under state constitution).
104. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127-28 (1926); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wail.) 128, 145-47 (1871); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 77, at 30-33.
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ment, or indispensable to one so delegated, may be exercised concur-
rently by two or all three departments. 105 For example, law is made by
both the legislative and judicial branches: in the former by adoption of
statutes and in the latter by the common-law process of judicial deci-
sions. Similarly, controversies are adjudicated by the quasi-judicial ad-
ministrative agencies within the executive branch. 06 It is therefore
clear that the separation of powers doctrine cannot be taken so literally
that it precludes concurrent exercise of delegated or implied powers.'0 7
Although there can be concurrent exercise of explicitly delegated
or inherent powers, the branch to which the power has been delegated
or is inherent prevails in cases of conflict. In Myers v. United States10 8
the Supreme Court decided that the power to remove executive officers
was indispensable to the exercise of the executive power vested in the
President. Therefore, a statute requiring Senate approval before a
postmaster could be dismissed was held ineffective when the President
dismissed a postmaster without seeking Senate agreement. As Chief
Justice Taft said, "Made responsible under the Constitution for the ef-
fective enforcement of the law, the President needs as an indispensable
aid to meet it the disciplinary influence upon those who act under him
of a reserve power of removal.'109 On the other hand, the President
could have acquiesced in the statutory arrangement by conditioning
dismissal on Senate approval without violating the separation of pow-
ers doctrine because powers vested in one branch can be delegated to
another. 0
Although the branch to which the power is indispensable has
supremacy regarding the manner and occasion of its exercise, the Court
has construed the scope of such "inherent" powers very narrowly. The
standard usually applied to determine the reach of inherent powers is
derived from Anderson v. Dunn,"' an 1821 case establishing the inher-
ent power of Congress to try and to punish contempts against it. The
Court held that this power, which would ordinarily be considered judi-
cial, was necessary if the legislative branch were to protect itself against
105. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 251,
74 A.2d 406, 412, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
106. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400 (1940); Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
107. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 20, at 915-16 (1976).
108. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
109. Id. at 170-73. As Professor Van Alstyne has noted, the weakness of the Myers decision
lies not in its enunciation of this principle, but in application of the principle to a subordinate
officer about whom the "reserve power of removal" could not reasonably be said to be an
"indispensable aid." Van Alstyne, supra note 101, at 802-04.
110. See 272 U.S. at 170-73.
111. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
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interference with its constitutional duties."12 The Court noted, how-
ever, that only the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed"
was inherent." 3 A power that is not indispensable to exercise of an
explicit power, but is only appropriate or helpful to its exercise, is con-
trolled by the branch to which powers of that type are allocated or, if
reasonably classifiable in more than one category, is under the aegis of
the legislature, which is given the power to make laws "necessary and
proper" to the exercise of all powers granted by the Constitution.'1 4
D. Judicial Supremacy Over Evidence Rules- Review of Authorities
Arguments that Congress has preemptive responsibility for formu-
lating evidence rules usually rely on statements in Wayman v.
Southard"' and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co." 6 directed at procedural
rules in the federal courts.' 7  Neither case, however, is persuasive
when the issue involves evidence rules.
Wayman v. Southard involved a conflict between state rules gov-
erning the manner by which execution would be levied and the federal
rules on the same subject. The latter had been adopted under the Proc-
ess Acts, which provided that process was to be governed by the com-
mon law, statutes, or rules of court." 8 In holding that the federal
government could regulate the conduct of its officers in executing fed-
eral court judgments, Chief Justice Marshall relied on Congress' power
under the necessary and proper clause, not the courts' power under ar-
ticle III:
The constitution concludes its enumeration of granted powers,
112. Id. at 227-29. The contempt power exercisable by Congress without judicial proceedings
was limited in Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189-90 (1890), to that necessary in pursuance
of the delegated powers to discipline its members for disorderly conduct, compel their attendance,
judge their qualifications, and conduct impeachments.
113. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231; c. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975) (adhering
to the "least possible power" principle of Anderson v. Dunn in construing court's power under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 to punish contempt summarily).
114. Van Astyne, sumpra note 101, at 794.
115. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
116. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
117. Dean Clark and Professor Moore suggest congressional supremacy without referring to
any case authority, pointing only to the statutory prescription of evidence rules and delegation of
rulemaking authority that has continued since the first Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73. See C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 44-45 n.129, 61-62 & n.166; 10 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcricF § 57 (2d ed. 1976); Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1303, 1309 n.17 (1936); Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme
Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28 A.B.AJ. 521, 523 n.I1 (1942).
118. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 2. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93; Act of May 8,
1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276. The case arose because the marshal had followed Kentucky proce-
dures. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 2. There is no indication in the report whether procedures other
than those used at common law had been prescribed either by the circuit court or the Supreme
Court.
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with a clause authorizing Congress to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof. The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in
certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render judg-
ment.
That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all
the judgments which the judicial department has power to pro-
nounce, is expressly conferred by this clause, seems to be one of
those plain propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer.
The terms of the clause neither require nor admit of elucidation.
The Court, therefore, will only say, that no doubt whatever is
entertained on the power of Congress over the subject.' 19
Similarly, in responding to the argument that making rules governing
execution on judgments was a legislative function, which could not be
delegated, 120 Marshall clearly assumed that the power to make such
rules, which clearly pertained to the judicial business,12' was a legisla-
tive one.' 22 The Court nevertheless held that the delegation was au-
thorized by the necessary and proper clause, and did not rely on the
judicial article, which would have been appropriate if the Court had
viewed the statute as merely confirming a rulemaking power already
possessed by the courts. 23 Thus, Wayman is said to stand for the pro-
position that the courts' power to "establish all necessary rules for the
orderly conducting [of] business in the said courts"' 24 has its source in a
statutory delegation made pursuant to Congress' necessary and proper
power-rather than inhering in the judicial power vested in the courts
119. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 22.
120. Id. at 42.
121. Van AIstyne, supra note 101, at 814.
122. See 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42-43. Professor Van Alstyne says: "What is interesting about
Marshall's response is its explicit assumption that indeed the power being exercised [to provide
rules specifying the manner in which federal court judgments were to be executed] is exclusively a
legislative one, i.e., a power solely to be exercised by Congress." Van Alstyne, supra note 101, at
814 (emphasis in original). That observation seems inconsistent with Marshall's statement:
It will not be contended, that congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other
tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But congress may cer-
tainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.
Without going further for examples, we will take that, the legality of which the counsel
for the defendants admit. The 17th section of the judiciary act, and the 7th section of the
additional act, empower the courts respectively to regulate their practice. It certainly will
not be contended, that this might not be done by congress. The courts, for example, may
make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and
other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended, that
these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the courts;
yet it is not alleged, that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42-43.
123. See Van Astyne, supra note 101, at 813-14.
124. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
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by the Constitution' 25-and that therefore Congress is supreme in reg-
ulating proceedings in the federal courts.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons for not reading the lan-
guage in Wayman so broadly as to encompass evidence rules. First, the
case did not involve a matter that is indispensable to exercise of the
judicial power. Although rules governing executions are significant in
determining the practical effect that will be given federal court judg-
ments, the essential judicial function of determining the facts of contro-
versies and deciding how the law applies to those facts is not impaired
by external regulation of the manner by which those decisions are ef-
fectuated.1 26 Put another way, execution of judgments is one of those
matters that could reasonably be regulated by either the judiciary or
the legislature without significantly impairing the independence of ei-
ther branch, which the constitutional separation of powers is intended
to protect. As such, the matter is one falling within Congress' residual
power to allocate. Thus, Marshall's reliance on the necessary and
proper clause rather than article III indicates only that rules regulating
the manner of execution are subject to congressional supremacy, not
that all procedural rulemaking is.
A second reason for not reading too much into Wayman is that the
case did not raise a separation of powers problem at all, but only a
question of federalism. The precise issue with which the Court was
concerned was whether state or federal law was to apply; there was no
suggestion that the federal court was about to apply its own rule in
disregard of any explicit or implicit directive of Congress.127 The
Court explicitly avoided the question of the "right of the Courts to alter
the modes of proceeding in suits at common law."' 28
Finally, Wayman should be read with caution because of the con-
text in which it was decided. Up through the Civil War, thinking about
the separation of powers doctrine was accompanied by a notion of leg-
125. Van Alstyne, supra note 101, at 813-14; Weinstein, supra note 20, at 927.
126. The court has performed its essential function of decision-making when it announces its
judgment. The traditionally accepted dependence on other agencies to execute that judgment is
implicit in the remark attributed to Andrew Jackson: "John Marshall has made his decision now
let him enforce it." M. McNAMARA, 2,000 FAMOUS LEGAL QUOTATIONS 149 (1967), citing SUM-
NER, ANDREW JACKSON 182 (1882). Or, as stated by Hamilton in The Federalist: "It is evident
that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be
enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these
sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword." THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (A. Hamil-
ton), at 77 (rev. ed. G. Smith 1901). By contrast, there can be no legal decision apart from a
finding of fact. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 66.
127. See 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 2, 21, 48.
128. Id. at 48.
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islative omnicompetence.' 2 9 As a general proposition, this notion was
founded on a perception of the legislature as directly representing the
will of "the people." Therefore, all the powers of the people devolved
upon the legislature.1 30 The training of lawyers tended at that time to
reinforce this perception. Apprentice training of lawyers emphasized
the procedural aspects of enforcing substantive rights. Defining rights
in terms of procedure and remedies suggested that the legislature could
not give up its power to regulate procedure without forfeiting its con-
trol over substance. Since the power to make any rules governing the
conduct of individuals, as well as the power to protect individuals
against arbitrary government, was vested in the legislature, it followed
that the legislature also controlled procedure. 131 Given these assump-
tions about the integral relation between what would now be called
substance and procedure, it is not surprising that judges deferred to
"the people's representative" even on questions regarding the conduct
of proceedings in the courts.
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 1 31 was decided long after such notions of
legislative omnicompetence had faded. Yet its language that "Con-
gress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the
statutes or constitution of the United States"'' 33 has been used to infer
congressional supremacy over procedural rules.13 4 Sibbach, too, does
not establish the point as a matter of constitutional law. The problem
before the Court was the enforceability of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
129. See Kaplan, supra note 89, at 56; Pound, supra note 97, at 34-35, 43.
130. See Pound, supra note 97, at 35. Examples of this supremacy included the calling of
judges before the legislature to justify their decisions and the adoption of statutes to reverse judg-
ments in particular cases. Id.
131. See Pound, The Rule-Making Power ofthe Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 600-01 (1926); Tyler,
supra note 25, at 775.
132. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
133. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
134. See C. CLARK, supra note 19, at 44-45 n. 129; J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-
MAKING PROCEDURES 90 (1977); Clinton, supra note 62, at 71, 72. Professor Clinton also quotes
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n. 11 (1959): "The power of
this Court to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the
absence of a relevant Act of Congress." Clinton, supra, at 72-73. As in Wayman and Sibbach, the
issue before the Court in Palermo was whether Congress had the power to prescribe rules of
procedure and not how to resolve a difference between statutory and court-made rules. See 360
U.S. at 353 n.l l. Even if Palermo were read to involve a conflict between the rule of Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and that of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), the matter involved (dis-
covery of statements given to the prosecution) has consequences involving the government's abil-
ity to function that go far beyond the conduct of the particular litigation. See Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 346, 350 (1959). Therefore, the matter is appropriately subject to congres-
sional supremacy. See text accompanying notes 163-68 infra.
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dure 35, which permitted orders compelling parties to submit to physi-
cal examinations. The statement quoted above reaffirmed Wayman's
point that Congress could regulate procedure and that delegation of
that power to the courts was not a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.1 35 The issue the Sibbach Court decided was whether Rule 35
contravened the enabling legislation because it "abridge[d] . . . sub-
stantive rights"; 136 since the Court concluded that it did not, there was
no conflict between the congressional directive and the Court-made
(and congressionally adopted) rule. 137 Thus, the Court never decided
whether the limitation on the Court's power to make rules "not incon-
sistent with the statutes" was enforceable as a matter of constitutional
law. 138
The argument that evidence rules are subject to judicial, not legis-
lative, supremacy gains some support in decisions that construed the
Conformity Act of 1872. The Act provided:
[T]he practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceed-
ing in other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and
district courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may
be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any
rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence
under the laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts
thereof. 139
The proviso, which included the statute's only reference to evidence
135. See 312 U.S. at 9-10 nn.6 & 7.
136. The Court noted:
The contention of the petitioner, in final analysis, is that Rules 35 and 37 are not
within the mandate of Congress to this court. This is the limit of permissible debate,
since argument touching the broader questions of Congressional power and of the obli-
gation of Federal courts to apply the substantive law of a state is foreclosed.
312 U.S. at 9.
137. Even a finding that the rule was "substantive" and therefore outside the ambit of the
enabling act would not necessarily have settled the issue because "substantive" matters seem
clearly within congressional supremacy; our concern is whether "procedural" matters are also.
138. Dealing specifically with that question, Dean (later Judge) Charles E. Clark expressed
doubt that federal courts had inherent power to make procedural rules in conflict with statutes. C.
CLARK, supra note 19, at 44-45 n.129; Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rulesof Appel-
-late Procedure, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1309 n.17 (1936); Clark, The Proper Function of the
Supreme Court's FederalRules Committee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521,523 n.11 (1942); accord, 10 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 87 (2d ed. 1976). His conclusion that the courts had acquiesced in legislative
supremacy in the matter appears, however, to have been based on statements in cases like
Wayman and Sibbach in which the issue was never squarely presented. Moreover, regardless of
its analytical necessity, Clark may have believed that an argument of inherent judicial power by
someone in his position as the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
have imperiled their acceptance by Congress.
139. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (repealed 1948).
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rules, was deleted in the Revised Statutes recodification of 1875.140 Al-
though the reference to the "rules of evidence. . . as practiced in the
courts" appears to except state evidence rules from the conformity prin-
ciple, the phrase was not relied upon for that purpose in the reported
cases, nor was deletion of the proviso cited as requiring conformity to
state evidence practice after 1875.11
Under the Conformity Act, and continuing the practice developed
long before the Act's adoption, the federal courts in most cases fol-
lowed state statutes regulating admissibility of evidence. 142 The con-
formity principle was not as consistently applied to state evidence rules
that had been created by judicial decision. State opinions, even those
construing state evidence statutes, were treated as persuasive, but not
controlling, authority. 143  Furthermore, some federal courts did not
consider themselves bound by state practice when the rule would not
be "convenient for the advancement of justice"'" or would "unwisely
encumber the administration of the law."'145 On that reasoning, one
court held there was no error in admitting a tabulation without calling
the clerks who made it, even though the common-law rule of the forum
state required their testimony.' 46
Although the question of the applicability of the Conformity Act
to evidence rules was never squarely presented to it, the Supreme Court
in several cases construed the Act narrowly when "the powers of the
judge, as defined by the common law, were largely trenched upon."' 147
The Court held in Nudd v. Burrows that judicial comment on the evi-
dence was not included in the words "practice, pleadings, and forms
and modes of proceeding" because it involved the "conduct and ad-
ministration of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions."' 48
The Court's restrictive view of the Act was followed in cases involving
140. See Rev. Stat. § 914, 18 Stat. 174 (2d ed. 1878).
141. See Exparte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720 (1885).
142. American Issue Pub. Co. v. Sloan, 248 F. 251, 253 (6th Cir. 1917). Of course, federal
rules either explicitly stated by statute or reasonably inferable from the statutory scheme took
precedence over state provisions. See, e.g., Potter v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 163, 165 (1880);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
143. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Kendall, 167 F. 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1909). See Union Pac. Ry. v.
Yates, 79 F. 584 (8th Cir. 1897).
144. Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618, 625 (1898). See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1927).
145. Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 301 (1876).
146. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir.
1927).
147. Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 442 (1875). See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 41, at 671-72; Clark & Moore, A New Federal CivilProcedure-I The Background, 44
YALE L.J. 387, 401-10 (1935).
148. 91 U.S. 426, 442 (1875).
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instructions to the jury,'49 the exhibits to go into the jury room,15 0 the
appropriateness of special verdicts, 15 1 the scope of cross-examina-
tion, 152 and the admissibility of character testimony.'53 Although the
Court in Nudd disclaimed any need to decide whether the legislative or
the judicial branch would prevail in case of a conflict, it stated that
there were "certain powers inherent in the judicial office."' 154 A year
later the Court, referring to Nudd but again not specifically deciding
the question, implied that there were constitutional limits on Congress'
power to "fetter the judge in the personal discharge of his accustomed
duties, or to trench upon the common-law powers with which in that
respect he is clothed." 155 Thus, although the courts purported to be
construing the Conformity Act and deciding whether Congress in-
tended it to apply to certain questions regarding the admissibility of
evidence and the conduct of trials, the language used and the construc-
tion reached suggest that there was an area in which these courts did
not consider themselves constrained to follow the congressional direc-
tion of conformity to state practice.
Dean Wigmore's assertion that "all legislative rules for judiciary
procedure are void constitutionally,"' 56 is no more persuasive than
statements that the legislature is supreme regarding evidence rules. As-
suming that his editorial note by that title was intended to be taken
seriously,1 57 it overstates the case in two major respects. First, use of
the word "void" implies that rules promulgated by the legislature have
149. St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Ry. v. Vickers, 122 U.S. 360 (1887); Vicksburg & M.R.R. v. Putnam,
118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886). See Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876). See
also Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 93-95 (1931) (judge's power to take issue from
jury); Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1894) (whether instructions must be written or may
be oral).
150. Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441-42 (1875).
151. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1889); Indianapolis & St.
L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876); see Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Malcolm, 164 U.S. 483,
490 (1896).
152. Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 626 (1879); American Issue Pub. Co. v. Sloan, 248 F. 251,
253-54 (6th Cir. 1917).
153. West Tenn. Grain Co. v. J.C. Shaffer & Co., 299 F. 197 (6th Cir. 1924). See also McDon-
ald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1915) (testimony of juror to impeach verdict); American Issue
Pub. Co. v. Sloan, 248 F. 251, 253 n.l (6th Cir. 1917).
154. 91 U.S. at 442, citing Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859) (Field, J.).
155. Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291,300 (1876). But see 21 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 395.
156. Wigmore, supra note 60.
157. See Pound, supra note 97, at 37; cf Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 33, 300 P. 575, 584
(1931) (Wigmore article cited for proposition that courts have inherent right, "irrespective of the
statutes and the common law," to make rules for procedure at trial). But see Joiner & Miller,
Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 628
(1957); Kaplan & Greene, supra note 60, at 251.
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no effect and should not be followed. Such a position applies the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine with more strictness than the cases would
support. 58 That even Wigmore would not go so far is indicated by his
concluding "proposition of law": "All rules of procedure declared by
the legislature are void, and have only such effect as the comity of the
judiciary may give byfollo wing them in the absence of any rule made by
the judiciary. "159
Second, and more important, the reference to "all" procedural
rules presupposes that authority to make rules regulating court proce-
dure can be inferred only from the judicial power. The point is made
explicitly: "All rules ofprocedure in courts, not expressly or impliedly
prescribed by the constitution, fall under the judiciary power, for the
purpose of making or changing them."'160 "[A]ll judiciary power, ex-
cept the definition of certain parts ofjurisdiction and the place of crim-
inal trials, is in the judiciary, not in the legislature."'16 1 Wigmore's
reasoning, however, is clearly inconsistent with the proposi-
tion-historically and analytically demonstrable-that the power to
make adjective law is one shared between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture. 162
E. Limits On Judicial Supremacy Over Rules Governing Court
Proceedings
Even if Wigmore's note is read as asserting only that the judiciary
is supreme with respect to all rules governing court proceedings, he
states the rule too broadly. As was discussed earlier, judicial
supremacy extends only to rulemaking that is indispensable to the
courts' functionhig. Rules that are only incidental or helpful to the ex-
ercise of the judicial power seem to be committed by the necessary and
proper clause to legislative supremacy.16 3
Furthermore, the judiciary must defer to the legislature in making
rules that are rationally classifiable within the inherent powers of both
branches. The legislature's function as "voice of the people" requires
that its rules enunciating public policy take precedence over contrary
rules adopted by the judiciary, even if the judicial rules are deemed
indispensable to the process of deciding controversies. 64 Certain evi-
158. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
159. Wigmore, srupra note 60, at 279 (emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted).
160. Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 277 (emphasis added), referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, art. III, §§ 1-3.
162. See Note, 34 Hv. L. REv. 424, 424 (1921); text accompanying notes 59-72 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 97-114 supra.
164. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 157, at 629-30; Reidl, supra note 103, at 604.
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dence rules may govern the probative effect to be given items of proof;
but at the same time, they may also reflect public policy determina-
tions, which are ultimately the responsibility of the legislature. It is not
always easy to decide when evidence rules go beyond regulating proba-
tive value and orderly court proceedings into the realm of public pol-
icy,165 but the decision is crucial to the separation of powers issue.
The line between areas of judicial and legislative supremacy is
sometimes described in terms of a distinction between "procedure" and
"substance": matters of court "procedure" have traditionally been
within the sphere of the judiciary, while matters of "substance" have
been committed to the legislature. That distinction, however, is insuffi-
ciently precise for the present purpose since most evidence rules, re-
gardless of their substantive effect, also regulate court procedure.166
The legislature's responsibility to announce public policy is, more pre-
cisely, a duty and power to define the rights and obligations of the gov-
erned among each other and in relation to the government. 67 The area
in which the legislature is supreme therefore includes not only the mak-
ing of rules that give guidance about primary activity, such as what
degree of care must be exercised in various circumstances, but also in-
cludes the making of rules that announce the consequences of breaches
of the rules governing primary activity-in other words, the type and
extent of remedy available if the rules' standards are not followed.
Furthermore, rules affect conduct when they predictably affect the like-
lihood that a breach of the rules' standards will be translated into a
judicial finding of that fact. Thus, people may conduct themselves dif-
ferently, including insuring themselves differently, depending upon
165. See Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of
Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 489 (1940).
166. See Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 345-47
(1960). The dangers of analyzing problems according to a substance-procedure dichotomy were
well expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about in the
books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But,
of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same keywords to very different
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represents the same invariants. Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is
used. . . .And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are
in common use in connection with situations turning on such different considerations as
those that are relevant to questions pertaining to expostfacto legislation, the impairment
of the obligations of contract, the enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and
the multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (citations omitted); see Cook, "Substance"
and " Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YAi.E L.J. 333, 353 (1933).
167. "The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe
rules for the regulation of the society . THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton), at 412-13
(rev. ed. G. Smith 1901).
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whether their expected adversary must prove a breach of the legal stan-
dard by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable
doubt. In sum, the legislature announces public policy not only when it
makes rules establishing standards of conduct, but also when it makes
rules predictably affecting the application of those standards.168 Thus,
the question whether court-made evidence rules come under legislative
supremacy depends upon whether they only regulate the manner in
which judicial decisions are made or go further and affect people's con-
duct outside the litigation context.
IV. Analyzing Specific Federal Rules
Congress intended some of its changes in the Federal Rules to af-
fect only the conduct of the decision-making process at trial. Conse-
quently, those rules may be disregarded by the federal courts on the
basis of judicial supremacy. For example, Congress deleted a hearsay
exception for statements so tending to make the declarant "an object of
hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true."' 169
This "social interest" exception was deleted because it lacked "suffi-
cient guarantees of reliability."' 0 Given that explicit determination, it
might appear inappropriate for a court applying the Federal Rules to
admit such statements under the "catch-all" exception, which requires"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."'' Never-
theless, since the rule involves only the probative value of the evi-
dence-the rule has no predictable out-of-court effect-the question
whether to admit declarations against social interest seems to be one on
which judicial, not legislative, judgments should prevail. As another
example, Congress added a requirement to the Federal Rules that a
party intending to offer hearsay evidence not specifically covered by
the listed exceptions, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, should "make known to the adverse party suffi-
168. See generally Ely, The Irrespressible Myth fErie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 725-27 (1974);
Weinstein, The Unfformi-Conformiy Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules ofEvidence, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 353, 361-73 (1969).
169. Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 804(b)(4).
170. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
7089.
171. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Cf. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Liti-
gation, 444 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("[lIt is unlikely that Congress meant this exception
[rule 804(b)(5)] to be used to circumvent its own restriction of another exception [former testimony
admissible only against parties to action in which it was given or their successors in interest]").
But see 120 CONG. REc. 40892-93 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BErGER, supra note 14, at 804-111.
195
HeinOnline  -- 57 Tex. L. Rev. 195 1978-1979
Texas Law Review
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to meet it, his intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declar-
ant."'172 This notice requirement is only a congressional statement of
one expeditious and orderly procedure for the presentation of certain
evidence. Yet, if it is applied literally the rule might exclude evidence
that could be admissible if some other expeditious and orderly proce-
dure were permitted. Since the rule has no object outside the litigation
process, it is one appropriately subject to judicial supremacy. 173
Congress made some other changes based explicitly on its dis-
agreement with the Advisory Committee's evaluation of the probative
value of the evidence. Nevertheless, these rules may be proper subjects
of legislative supremacy because of the contexts in which they are usu-
ally applied. For example, the second sentence of rule 804(b)(3) was
amended to exclude declarations against penal interest offered to ex-
culpate the accused "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indi-
cate the trustworthiness of the statement." 174 The House Judiciary
Committee decided that the Court's simple corroboration requirement
was insufficient to ensure the trustworthiness of exculpatory state-
ments, which are more suspect than other declarations against penal
interest. 175 The effect of the congressional change, however, was to
shift the balance between the government and the accused to make
conviction more likely in some cases. The change will never make con-
viction less likely because no corroboration requirement was imposed
on the government. Thus, the rule may be said to have a "substantive"
effect, which makes it a proper subject of legislative supremacy. A sim-
ilar effect may also be discerned in changes in the rule governing prior
172. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
173. Several courts have dispensed with the pretrial notice requirement when other proce-
dures, such as continuances, have accomplished the congressional purpose. See, e.g., United
States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777, 784 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978) (defendant had
statement before trial); United States v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (3-day
recess after statement offered). But see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977)
("There is absolutely no doubt that Congress intended that the requirement of advance notice be
rigidly enforced").
174. The second sentence of the proposed rule provided: "A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corrob-
orated." Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 804(b)(4, . To the extent that the final version
imposes a strict corroboration requirement, it may run afoul of the teaching of Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-303 (1973), that hearsay rules precluding admission of reliable exculpa-
tory evidence deny due process. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 14, at 804-91 to
-93; id at 111-13 (Supp. 1977).
175. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7089-90.
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inconsistent statements of a witness. 176 The Court's draft treated all
such statements as nonhearsay; the final rule gave that treatment only
to statements made under oath subject to the penalty of perjury. The
announced purpose of the change was to increase the reliability of the
statement in two distinct senses: ensuring that the statement was made,
and increasing the dependability of its content.' 77 Particular concern
was expressed that under the Court's draft a criminal defendant could
be convicted solely on the basis of a prior inconsistent statement about
which there might be a substantial question whether it was ever actu-
ally made.17 1 In light of that reasoning, Congress quite appropriately
drew the balance between prosecutor and accused by drafting a rule
with a predictable effect of making it more difficult for a conviction to
result. However, to the extent that the rule also applies to civil cases (in
which it has no predictable effects for any class of litigants), it is merely
a congressional evaluation of probative value, a matter about which the
courts should be supreme.
The Federal Rules of Evidence also include several provisions in
which the changes made by Congress in the Supreme Court's version
will, or are expected to, affect out-of-court conduct. Rules of privilege,
for example, are justified by their tendency to promote socially desira-
ble communications. 79 A major factor in the congressional decision to
revise the Federal Rules was the belief that the Court's privilege rules
did not appropriately reflect the public policies involved in protecting
(ie., encouraging) communications between doctor and patient, hus-
band and wife, and informant and government agency. 80 Similarly,
the change from having presumptions shift the burden of persuasion to
their having only a "bursting bubble" effect'"' affects the balance be-
tween the parties and, as a result, may alter the parties' out-of-court
conduct. For example, if plaintiffs cannot shift the burden of proof on
the issue of due care to the defendant by proving a statutory viola-
176. Compare FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(1)(A) with Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule
801(d)(l)(A).
177. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7086-87.
178. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 n.21, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 7063 n.21.
179. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
180. See generaly Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H. 5463 Before the Sen-
ate Comn on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280-98, 306-08 (1974); Proposed Rules of Evidence..
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform ofFederal Criminal Laws of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 2, at 192-94, 342-51, 449-81, 583-89 (1973); Ely, supra
note 168, at 694. See also Friedenthal, supra note 2, at 683-85.
181. Compare Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 301 with FED. R. EVID. 301. See
generaly SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 7055-56.
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tion, 182 then plaintiffs will lose more cases than if the burden of proof
were shifted by the presumption. The congressional change in rule 301
was, therefore, an implicit assertion that the Court had misjudged the
appropriate balance between the parties in many types of controver-
sies.183
In addition to changes made to implement public policies about
out-of-court conduct, and those made to regulate the trial process or
ensure the trustworthiness of evidence, there were changes for which
the explicit justification was some notion of "fairness." Thus, the
amendment to rule 803(8), which excluded records of matters observed
by law enforcement personnel in criminal cases, followed a House de-
bate in which "fair trial" was a major concern. 184 Similarly, the former
182. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (West Supp. 1978).
183. Two comments must be made about the illustrations used in text. First, saying that the
privilege and presumption rules will have consequences beyond the litigation does not mean that
they are thereby inappropriate subjects of court-made rules. Presumption rules, for example, can
involve problems in deciding the controversy: the Senate and the conference committees rejected a
House-passed version of rule 301 that would have treated presumptions as evidence because the
House rule might confuse juries in performance of their duties. See SENATE REPORT, supra note
7, at 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7056; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 5-6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7099. As for the privilege
rules, in rule 501 Congress ultimately delegated to the courts power to define privileges in decid-
ing federal claims or defenses:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the princioles 0/the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts ofthe United States in the light ofreason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added). Thus, the out-of-court effects of these types of rules only
establish legislative supremacy, not judicial incompetency. Second, as a practical matter, the con-
gressional concern with these two areas and with the general rule on competency of witnesses,
compare FED. R. EVID. 601 with Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule 601, was not so much
the appropriate spheres of legislature and judiciary as it was the proper relations between the
federal and state governments. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7082-83; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7, 11-13, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7052-54, 7058-59; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 13,
at 7-8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7100-02. As a result, state rules of
presumptions, privileges, and competency were applied when state law supplied the rule of deci-
sion. See FED. R. EVID. 301, 501, 601. The concern for not invading the province of the states
was, nevertheless, very similar to the present concern for not trenching on the legislature; ultimate
authority over matters affecting the out-of-court conduct of citizens is divided by the Constitution
between the federal legislature (which has explicit and inherent powers, as well as power to make
legislation necessary and proper for exercise of other powers given the federal government), see
U.S. CONST. art. I, and the states (to which are reserved all other powers), see U.S. CONST. amend.
X. Implicit, therefore, in the judgment that a proposed rule invaded the powers reserved to the
states was the judgment that it was a matter over which Congress would otherwise be supreme.
184. See 120 CONG. REC. 2387-88 (1974).
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testimony exception"' was made applicable only if the party against
whom the evidence was offered, or his predecessor in interest in a civil
action, had been given an opportunity to develop the testimony, be-
cause the House Judiciary Committee believed that "it is generally un-
fair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is
being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was
previously handled by another party."' 6 The conference committee
also added requirements of advance notice of intent to offer a convic-
tion over ten years old, 187 or hearsay evidence under the catch-all ex-
ceptions,18 8 in order to give the opponent a "fair opportunity" to
contest the use of the evidence. 89 Although "fairness" would seem to
be a matter that the legislature, as the people's representatives, would
be particularly well qualified to determine, there is a good argument, at
least in the latter of the above examples, that the area of judicial
supremacy was invaded. Rules to provide a "fair opportunity" to meet
evidence are rules for orderly procedures that are not intended to have
a predictable effect on the decision on the merits other than to ensure
the fullest possible presentation of relevant evidence. Seen in that light,
the notice requirements of rules 609(b), 803(24), and 804(b)(5) should
not be imposed rigidly, but should be applied or disregarded as the
court believes will best assist the fact-finding process.
At the other extreme, the "fair trial" concern regarding the use of
police reports' 90 may indicate congressional balancing of prosecution
and defense interests in criminal cases. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee explained the change only in terms of the probative value of such
reports: "[O]bservations by police officers at the scene of the crime or
the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by
public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the
confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal
185. FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(1).
186. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
7088.
187. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
188. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
189. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10, 12, 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 7103, 7105, 7106.
190. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). In an attempt to avoid the strictures of rule 803(8), some
reports by official agencies that had heretofore been accepted routinely (e.g., chemical analyses of
seized substances, records of gun registrations) are now offered as business records under rule
803(6). However, the Second Circuit has read the legislative history of 803(8) as requiring, in a
narcotics prosecution, exclusion of a report by a Customs Service chemist. See United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68-80 (2d Cir. 1977). But see United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d
Cir. 1976) (police records of seized guns admissible). Seegeneral i 4 J. WmNSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 14, at 67-69 (Supp. 1977).
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cases." '  They introduced that explanation, however, with the word"ostensibly"; furthermore, the House debates included repeated asser-
tions that it should not be possible "to convict people where the police
officer's statement is not subject to cross-examination."' 92 Thus, it can
be argued that Congress intended to impose a burden on a predictable
class of litigants, ie., prosecutors. That burden could affect out-of-
court conduct because police might conduct more careful investigations
if they know that in proving the case they cannot rely on reports not
subject to cross-examination.
It is more difficult to determine the sense in which Congress ap-
plied the concept of fairness to the change limiting the admissibility of
former testimony to that given when the present opponent or his prede-
cessor in interest had an opportunity to examine the witness.193 The
change in the rule has no predictable effect: sometimes it will work to
the advantage of plaintiffs, sometimes for defendants. At the same
time, there is no basis for saying that testimony previously offered
against one with a similar motive to develop it is necessarily less relia-
ble than if the present opponent had been a party when it was origi-
nally given. 194 The change in the former testimony rule, therefore,
seems to be neither a clear exercise of the legislature's powers over"substantive" matters nor a clear intrusion on the judicial power to de-
termine the reliability of evidence to be used in the decision-making
process. If an explanation must be chosen, however, it probably would
be the latter: the legislature was probably more concerned that some
litigants would be faced with former testimony that was not sufficiently
developed, than that decisions on controversies in which such evidence
had been received would tend in a predictable manner over the long
run not to reflect the public policies established by the legislature.
Thus, the legislative judgment made in amending rule 804(b)(1) seems
to be one that a court could properly disregard in order to perform its
constitutional function of fairly deciding controversies.
191. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 17, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 7064.
192. 120 CONG. Rc. 2388 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Johnson); see id. at 2387-88 (remarks of
Reps. Holtzman & Brasco). Representative Dennis, who proposed the amendment excluding po-
lice observations as official records, id. at 2387, explicitly denied that he was intending to impugn
the trustworthiness of police officers. Id. at 2388.
193. Compare FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) with Proposed Fed. R. Evid., supra note 3, rule
804(b)(1).
194. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 256, at 620 (2d ed. E.
Cleary et al. 1972); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 14, at 804-61 to -65; Falknor, Former
Testimony andthe Uniform Rules.'A Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 654-55 (1963); Martin, The
Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal.Rules ofEvidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 559
(1972).
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V. Conclusion
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a case study of how deli-
cate the balance between the branches of government under the separa-
tion of powers principle can be.'95 The traditionally, if imprecisely,
stated balance, which left matters of "procedure" to the courts while
the legislature had authority over regulation of "substance," was first
upset when the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court included nu-
merous provisions, especially those regarding privileges, that had sig-
nificant public policy components. 96
The congressional response was not only to prescribe what it con-
sidered appropriate privilege rules, but also to review the entire evi-
dence code and, as revised, to enact it into law. By providing that the
statutory evidence rules, except those dealing with privileges, could be
amended without legislative approval, 97 Congress might be said to
have reestablished the equilibrium between legislature and judiciary.
There appears, however, to be a continuing threat to that balance.
Experience so far with the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates
that some courts have quite liberally construed various rules. While
the rules leave much to the courts' discretion, in a number of instances
it appears that they have been applied without regard to, or even in
defiance of, explicit congressional directives or intentions. 98 In certain
circumstances it is appropriate for a court to substitute its judgment for
that of Congress in determining admissibility. While the courts have
been given great latitude in excluding evidence, a judge may occasion-
ally believe that the Federal Rules unnecessarily limit the reception of
195. See also Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 77, at 1-2.
196. Such a misjudgment of the political consequences, if not of the theoretical limits, of the
judicial branch's competency suggests strongly the need for reform of the rulemaking process.
Recent calls for reform are made in, e.g., J. WEIN sTEIN, supra note 134; Clinton, supra note 62;
Friedenthal, supra note 2.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Schole, 553 F.2d 1109, 1123-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977) (computer printout prepared by Drug Enforcement Administration admitted under
rule 803(6) although arguably inadmissible under rule 803(8)(B)); United States v. Grady, 544
F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (police records of weapons found in Northern Ireland admitted under
rule 803(8)(B) although they were "matters observed by. . . law enforcement personnel"); United
States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1976) (prior inconsistent statements to FBI agents
admitted under rule 803(24) although inadmissible under rule 801(d)(1)(A) because they were not
made under oath subject to penalty of peijury); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (statement admitted under rule 803(24) without no-
tice given before trial); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 108, 109 (D. Conn.), aff'd
without opinion, 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976) (United States deemed "predecessor in interest" for
purpose of admitting former testimony under rule 804(b)(1) against plaintiff in private antitrust
action). I am not suggesting that in the above cases the courts' results were either unreasonable or
impossible to justify, only that the results appear to be inconsistent with relatively specific statu-
tory language.
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probative evidence. So long as the applicable rule is founded only on
considerations of the probative value of the evidence or orderly con-
duct of the trial, the court should be free to use its inherent power to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress. When, however, the court
is faced with a rule the application of which has a predictable effect on
out-of-court conduct, it has a responsibility to comply with the congres-
sional restrictions even if the result is to exclude evidence the court
considers probative. Only if courts interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence make an effort to analyze the particular rules in light of the
criteria suggested here can the proper balance between the legislative
and judicial branches be maintained.
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